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Abstract 
The pursuit of civil nuclear power, frequently justified in the name of national energy security, 
paradoxically entangles most states in long-term interdependencies with the few countries capable 
of supplying nuclear technologies. These interdependencies are insufficiently documented and 
poorly understood. This article presents and analyzes a new dataset of nuclear cooperation 
agreements signed or announced between 2000 and 2015. We find that Russia and the US 
dominate international technological nuclear cooperation, with the US’ dominance particularly 
prominent in safety and security and Russia’s – in nuclear power plant construction, reactor and 
fuel supply, decommissioning and waste. When it comes to these technologies, Russia is the 
supplier in approximately half of all agreements; France, the US, China, Korea, and Japan together 
account for another 40%. All in all, six countries are suppliers in over 90% of all international 
nuclear agreements, a far higher supplier concentration than in oil and gas markets. These results 
show that the global future of nuclear power depends as much on international cooperation as on 
national motivations and capacities. Effective policies and institutions supporting the safe use of 
nuclear power should therefore be directed at managing its international as well as national aspects.  
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1. Introduction 
In the run-up to the Paris climate talks, Jim Hansen and three other prominent climate scientists 
argued that nuclear power “will make the difference between the world missing crucial climate 
targets or achieving them” (Hansen et al., 2015). The argument sparked a vigorous debate on 
whether nuclear power expansion is even feasible, particularly given its history of rising costs and 
roots in vertically-integrated electricity markets (Bradford, 2015; Oreskes, 2015). This debate 
framed nuclear energy as primarily a national project. Hansen and colleagues argued that nuclear 
expansion “is technically achievable because France and Sweden were able to ramp up nuclear 
power to high levels in just 15-20 years”. Oreskes countered, arguing expansion is unlikely given 
that France cannot even build a nuclear power plant on-time and under-budget.  
Historically, the expansion of nuclear energy in frontrunner countries was a national effort: in the 
1950s and 60s the Soviets, British, Americans and Canadians all started and expanded their nuclear 
programs based on domestic technologies. Even in countries where the introduction of nuclear 
power relied on foreign involvement, the programs were relatively quickly ‘localized’ and by the 
1980s looked by and large national. Such experiences are well-documented in France (Hecht, 
2001), West Germany (Mez and Piening, 2002), Japan (Smith and Rose, 1989), and Korea (Choi 
et al., 2009).1 Yet, the techno-national view of nuclear power may be less relevant in the future, 
when its biggest expansion is expected in developing and emerging economies (IAEA, 2014a) that 
have historically relied on technology transfer from nuclear frontrunners (Poneman, 1982). In an 
analysis of some 50 countries with aspirations to start a nuclear power program, Jewell (2011) 
concluded that very few of them will be able to do so without strong international support.  
                                                 
1 The Chinese actually designed and built their first nuclear power plant but since then have imported technology 
from France, Canada, Russia and the US (Zeng et al., 2016). 
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There are cases where insufficient international support undermined the success of national 
nuclear power programs. In Turkey, disagreements between vendor countries and the government 
led to the failure of two of the country’s attempts to introduce nuclear power (Jewell and Ates, 
2015). The country is currently relying on two intergovernmental agreements in its fifth attempt: 
one with Russia and one with a Franco-Japanese consortium. The Russian agreement is a build-
own-operate arrangement under which Russia will build the nuclear power plant as well as supply 
it with fuel, personnel and waste management in exchange for ownership and a guaranteed 
electricity price for a set period of time. A similar agreement with Russia is being implemented in 
Belarus and also under consideration in Hungary (WNN, 2016). These types of deals have raised 
concerns within national security communities in the West especially when the client is a North-
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member (Galluci and Schellenberger, 2017). Russia’s 
dominance in the reactor-supply market is attracting attention from international relations and 
security communities (Galluci and Schellenberger, 2017; Saha, 2017). However, Russia is not the 
only active supplier today. A South Korean company is building a new nuclear power plant in the 
United Arab Emirates (UAE). Thus, the debate on the future of nuclear power should not be 
analyzed only in terms of national capacities and motivation to build and operate nuclear power 
plants but also in terms of the potential for and constraints to international cooperation. 
In spite of the importance of international cooperation in the development of nuclear power, the 
literature on the topic is fragmented. There is a long tradition of scholarly work investigating the 
proliferation risk from spreading nuclear know-how (e.g. Fuhrmann, 2009a; 2009b; Kroenig, 
2009a; 2009b; Warburg, 2012) including the proliferation risks of a future nuclear power expansion 
(Ebinger and Massy, 2010; Lehtveer and Hedenus, 2015a). However, the empirical research on the 
current global nuclear energy landscape does not systematically answer which countries may play 
a major role shaping the future of nuclear energy. There are a few recent single cases and industry 
reports (Galluci and Schellenberger, 2017; Ramberg, 2015; Saha, 2017; WNA, 2016a) and broad 
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overviews of fuel fabrication (IAEA 2012), nuclear power plant supply (Cherp et al. 2012) and 
technology supply chain capacities (Brutschin and Jewell 2018). Additionally, work on nuclear 
clients, distinguishes between nuclear independents, who develop nuclear power on their own and 
dependents, who prefer rapid and cheap deployment by importing the technology (Poneman 
1982). More recently, Lantis (2014) is one of the first scholars to look at the interplay between 
suppliers and clients by studying the negotiation processes and the role of strategic and economic 
considerations in international nuclear cooperation between three suppliers (the United States, 
Japan and Russia) in two developing markets (Jordan and Vietnam).  
The main insights that emerge from this literature are that: (1) there are significant asymmetries 
within the nuclear technology market and (2) the geography and international political economy 
of international cooperation in nuclear energy differs between different parts of the nuclear supply 
chain (Brutschin and Jewell, 2018). However, this literature does not answer the question: Which 
types of arrangements, countries and practices will shape the future of nuclear energy? 
In this article, we explore this question through a systematic analysis of nuclear cooperation and 
break this overarching research question into three sub-questions: 
1. What are the main types of international nuclear energy cooperation and how widespread 
is each type of cooperation?  
2. Which countries are the main actors in each type of international technological nuclear 
energy cooperation? 
3. What are the characteristics of the international technological nuclear energy cooperation 
network? 
We define nuclear cooperation as when two or more states share information, knowledge or 
material resources related to nuclear power technologies. We answer the first research question by 
separating different parts of the nuclear supply chain and considering separately technological 
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cooperation and uranium mining and supply. With respect to the former, we further differentiate 
supportive cooperation and capacity building and exchange of knowledge (not involving concrete 
infrastructure development or material handling) from concrete cooperation. We also differentiate 
between cooperation involving asymmetric supplier-client relationships and more symmetric 
partnerships. We analyze these different types of cooperation by descriptive statistics.  
For the second and third research questions, we focus only on international technological nuclear 
cooperation and exclude uranium-related agreements. We do this for two reasons. First, a state’s 
pursuit of and expansion of nuclear power is dependent on first and foremost acquiring the 
technology and not on uranium imports; the leading exporters of nuclear technologies are not the 
leading exporters of uranium (Brutschin and Jewell, 2018). Second, our method relies on 
international cooperation as a proxy for dominance in the international nuclear landscape. For 
uranium, a much better measure would be uranium trade (such as UN Comtrade (2016)) which is 
beyond the scope of this article. We answer the second and third research questions with a 
combination of descriptive statistics and network analysis. The former is a toolset which has been 
used to examine the structure of relationships between countries (Hafner-Burton et al., 2009; 
Lloyd et al., 2009; Maoz, 2012; Nordlund, 2011) and how these relationships determine, constrain 
and enable their activities (Maoz, 2011). The details of our methodology are described in the next 
section followed by a report of our results related to each of the research questions and a discussion 
of the limitations of our approach and our conclusions. 
2. Methods 
2.1. Data collection  
We define international nuclear cooperation as activities in which two or more states share, 
exchange, or combine material resources, knowledge, or information related to the development 
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of nuclear power technologies. To study such cooperation, we built an original dataset of nuclear 
energy cooperation agreements and non-binding statements of cooperation (memoranda of 
understanding – MoUs – and policy statements) involving two or more countries and concluded 
between 2000-2015. In this article, we call these documents “cooperation units”. Using 
cooperation agreements is increasingly being used to study interactions between states in several 
disciplines including international relations (Kinne 2013, Dorussen et al 2016, Gallop 2016), 
environmental governance (Hollway et al 2016, Bodin and Prell 2011) and economics (Currarini 
et al 2015, Serrano 2003, Saban et al 2010). In this piece, we analyze technological interactions 
between states in order to understand how it may shape future energy choices. We focus on post-
2000 accounts of international nuclear cooperation because it captures cooperation efforts which 
are actively shaping today’s nuclear power programs. In addition to cases where there was evidence 
that a cooperation agreement was signed between two or more countries, we included data on 
non-binding statements of cooperation related to cooperation. The dataset was compiled between 
June 2014 and February 2015 from open sources and supplemented with a previously-published 
catalogue of nuclear cooperation agreements from Keeley (2009a; 2009b). Our dataset includes 
the following information for each agreement: title of the cooperation unit, supplier, client and 
partner countries, number of parties, type of cooperation, and reference.  
We compiled the dataset from five sources: the World Nuclear Association website’s Country 
Profiles (WNA, n.d.), news articles from the Nuclear Security Science and Policy Institute (NSSPI, 
n.d.), the World Nuclear News database (WNN, n.d.), a catalogue of bi-national cooperation 
maintained by James F. Keeley (2009b; 2009a) and targeted online searches. Our method of data 
collection followed five steps. First, we read the WNA profile for the 50 countries which are listed 
to identify cooperation units. Second, we searched WNN and the NSSPI databases for news 
articles covering agreements of nuclear cooperation and/or statements of cooperation related to 
nuclear energy. Once a cooperation agreement between two countries was identified (including 
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those countries not on the WNA list), we searched for it in Google using the following formula: 
“nuclear agreement” + “country X” + “country Y”. Any information we found was listed in the 
database with a reference to the most complete (preferably primary) data source. Third, we 
integrated Keeley’s catalogue of bi-national nuclear cooperation agreements for the relevant time 
period.2 Finally, to complement the information from existing sources, we used Google to search 
for “nuclear agreement” and “country X” as well as “nuclear cooperation” and “country X” for 
all countries which had at least one cooperation agreement in either of the existing databases, have 
nuclear power, or are actively developing nuclear power.3 
2.2. Coding cooperation units 
We began coding each cooperation unit by recording whether it was a formally signed agreement 
or a non-binding agreement (joint political announcement or memorandum of understanding). In 
the next step, we coded each cooperation unit according to the type of cooperation it included. 
Similar to Brutschin and Jewell (2018), we consider international technological nuclear cooperation 
in two distinct sectors: (1) nuclear power plant construction, reactor manufacturing, and nuclear 
fuel cycle; and (2) uranium mining and supply. We call cooperation related to nuclear reactor 
construction and manufacturing and the nuclear fuel cycle, technological cooperation and 
related to uranium mining and trade, uranium cooperation – Table 1. Within technological 
cooperation we further distinguish concrete cooperation related to the nuclear power plant 
construction and operation, reactor supply, the nuclear fuel cycle and decommissioning and waste 
                                                 
2 In combining these two databases, we cross-checked the agreements in order to eliminate all repetitions.  
3 The references we used to identify each of those cases includes: the Power Reactor Information System from the 
IAEA (IAEA, 2010), country profiles from the World Nuclear Association (WNA, n.d.), and recent reviews on the 
nuclear energy industry (Rogner, 2013; Schneider and Froggatt, 2013). 
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management4 and supportive cooperation related to knowledge transfer, training, nuclear safety 
and security, and planning, regulation and supportive infrastructure – Table 1. 
We coded cooperation categories and sub-categories in a non-exclusive manner. For example, the 
intergovernmental agreement between Russia and Turkey includes provisions for plant 
construction, training and waste management, among others, so all of these categories were listed 
in the database for that agreement. If a cooperation unit explicitly included both concrete and 
supportive elements it was coded as belonging to both categories5. For the agreements compiled 
from Keeley’s (2009b) list, we coded the agreement based on the database where it was clear from 
the title of the agreement. For example, an agreement titled “Nuclear Safety Agreement” would 
be coded as falling within the “Nuclear Safety” category. For agreements that did not contain 
sufficient details in Keeley’s catalogue, we searched for the original source; if it was not accessible 
we coded the agreement as “Supportive with no further information”. 
Finally, we distinguished two modes of cooperation: directional and partnerships. This was 
important not only for categorizing the cooperation units, but also for determining the role actors 
play in different cooperation. In directional cooperation one country (supplier) provides 
technological support, nuclear materials or capacity building assistance to another country (client). 
This type of cooperation often involves nuclear newcomer6 countries importing equipment and 
expertise from countries with developed nuclear capabilities (Choi et al., 2009; e.g. Smith and Rose, 
1989). In directional cooperation, a supplier country has more technological capabilities than the 
                                                 
4 Strictly speaking, waste management is typically considered part of the nuclear fuel cycle. We consider it along with 
decommissioning because long-term waste management strategies are usually developed along with 
decommissioning strategies. 
5 In practice, virtually all concrete technological cooperation also implies supportive cooperation. For example, 
reactor supply normally includes some training. However, we only coded the cooperation as supportive if supportive 
elements were explicitly listed or named. 
6 We use the term ‘Newcomer’ for countries which are trying to introduce nuclear power. 
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client or recipient country. Directional cooperation is signaled with wording such as “assistance” 
or “support”.7 
Table 1 Coding categories for types of cooperation 
Categories Sub-categories Description 
Directional Supplier(s) and client(s) can be clearly identified 
Partnerships Supplier(s) and client(s) cannot be clearly identified 
Agreement A formally signed document was present 
Non-binding Memorandum of Understanding or Joint Statement: No formally signed 
agreement was identified 
Technological Related to nuclear technology and the nuclear fuel cycle 
Technological Concrete Material cooperation related to nuclear power 
 
Nuclear power plant 
construction and 
operation 
construction of, financing, maintenance and repairs of nuclear power 
plants 
 
Reactor supply supply of both nuclear reactors for power production, research or 
maritime propulsion 
 
Nuclear fuel cycle supply of enriched nuclear fuel or other material related to the fuel 
cycle for nuclear power plants, including fuel fabrication, reprocessing, 
and fuel plant construction 
 
Decommissioning 
and waste 
management 
nuclear power plant decommissioning and waste management as well 
as nuclear waste handling procedures 
Technological Supportive Capacity development for nuclear power 
 
Knowledge 
exchange and 
training 
information exchange, training and capacity building, technology 
transfer, intellectual property rights, academic or research cooperation, 
local industry development 
 
Nuclear safety and 
security 
safety measures to prevent accidents and security measures to guard 
against nuclear material or fissile materials falling into the wrong hands 
 
Planning, regulation 
and supportive 
infrastructure 
planning and feasibility studies, developing and harmonizing regulation 
and supportive infrastructure related to nuclear power plants and 
materials 
 No information cooperation units for which no additional information was available 
Uranium Mining operations usually for the purpose of uranium trade 
                                                 
7 For example, in one agreement Ghana and Russia agree to bilateral cooperation in the “assistance in developing 
nuclear energy infrastructure in the Republic in Ghana” (technological concrete cooperation). 
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If no clear directional relationship could be identified, the agreement was coded as a partnership. 
Partnerships are common between two countries with similar technological capabilities or are 
signaled with wording such as ‘exchange’ or ‘joint venture’. If there was no clear direction of 
capacity development, even if the two parties have different capabilities, the cooperation unit was 
coded as a partnership.8 In fact, much cooperation on nuclear safety relates primarily to exchange 
of information and thus was coded as ‘Supportive Partnerships’.  
2.3. Coding roles of actors in cooperation 
The database record for each cooperation unit includes information about the participating 
countries and their roles.9 Each party to a directional cooperation unit was coded as ‘supplier’ or 
‘client’. Parties to non-directional agreements were coded as ‘partners’. Where there were three 
partners involved in an agreement (so-called ‘tri-partite’ agreements), each bi-directional 
relationship was coded independently.10  
Non-exclusive coding of cooperation units meant that in some agreements the same party was 
coded as both a supplier and a client. This was most common recorded in uranium-related 
agreements, many of which also involved directional technological cooperation. For example, 
Algeria and Russia have an agreement which covers planning for a nuclear power plant and 
uranium prospecting/mining development in Algeria, with Algeria potentially supplying uranium 
                                                 
8 One example is a joint declaration between the UK and India to facilitate cooperation in various areas related to 
nuclear power including trade and research. Another example of a partnership agreement is an arrangement between 
Slovenia and Italy “for the early exchange of information in the event of a radiological emergency and cooperation in 
nuclear safety matters”. 
9 This assumption is appropriate since in the majority of cases, nuclear cooperation agreements are between two states 
or state-owned companies. Even in countries where private corporations are involved in nuclear cooperation, their 
activities are often heavily regulated by the state. For example, in the US, companies can only cooperate with countries 
which have signed a ‘123 agreement’ with the US. 
10 For example, in one agreement, Finland partnered with Russia to provide assistance to develop a nuclear power 
plant in Bulgaria. In this case, Russia and Finland were coded as supplier countries with Bulgaria as the client country, 
and Russia and Finland were coded as having a partnership cooperation.  
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to Russia in the future. This agreement was coded as both a concrete technological cooperation 
unit (reactor and nuclear power plant construction) with Russia as the supplier and Algeria as the 
client, as well as a uranium cooperation unit with Algeria as the supplier and Russia as the client.11 
2.4. Data and network analysis 
To answer the first research question (What are the main types of international nuclear energy cooperation 
and how widespread is each type of cooperation?) we counted cooperation units that fall into each of the 
categories and sub-categories listed in Table 1. These categories also structured our analysis for 
the second and third questions, where we used both descriptive statistics and network analysis. 
Within the network analysis, countries (or jurisdictions) are nodes and cooperation units are links. 
Directional cooperation was represented by directed links and partnerships by undirected links. 
We analyzed four different networks independently: all technological nuclear cooperation units 
together, all technological supportive (both directional and partnerships), technological concrete 
directional, and technological concrete partnerships. Analyzing these networks separately allowed 
us to zoom-in on different types and modes of cooperation individually. The weights of the links 
were defined by adding the number of cooperation links signed between two countries.12 
To answer the second research question (Which countries are the main actors in each type of international 
technological nuclear energy cooperation?) we calculated the prevalence of each country in different types 
and subtypes of cooperation. Additionally, for each of the networks, we calculated the number of 
countries a given country had cooperation with (the degree of the respective node) and the 
number of cooperation units in which a given country participated (weighted degree of the 
                                                 
11 In the database these agreements are denoted with an “A” and a “B” at the end of the number. 
12 Self-loops, i.e. when two or more different entities of the same country were parties to the same cooperation 
agreement, were not recorded. For example, in a few agreements, Areva and Électricité de France are joint suppliers. 
In these cases, the France-Client country relationship was only counted once in the network analysis and descriptive 
statistics. 
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respective node). To identify the most the active suppliers and clients involved in directional 
cooperation we calculated out and in degree for each node (i.e. the number of directional links 
originating or ending in the node). We also calculated the net-degree, both weighted and un-
weighted: subtracting in-degrees of nodes from their out-degrees. This measure indicates whether 
the country is predominantly a supplier (positive net-degree) or a client (negative net-degree).  
To analyze how central a particular country is in a particular type of cooperation we calculated the 
closeness centrality of each node. Closeness centrality is an indicator of how ‘close’ a country to 
all others, i.e. how easily it can ‘reach’ other nodes through connections (or links) in the network: 
the more central a country is, the closer it is to all other countries in the network (Freeman, 1978; 
Wasserman and Faust, 1994). It is calculated by taking the reciprocal of the sum of the shortest 
paths from the node to all other nodes of the network (see note to Table 2). With respect to 
nuclear cooperation it can, for example, signal how easily technologies from a supplier country can 
reach potential client countries or how easily intangible knowledge can be exchanged between 
partner countries.13 
To answer the third question (What are the characteristics of the international nuclear energy cooperation 
network?) we measured the size (the number of nodes (countries), links (unique country pairs) and 
total sum of links (number of cooperation unit pairs) and density (the percentage of all possible 
connections between countries which are actually present in the network) of each network. We 
also calculated how many connected components there are in the network: do all nodes form a 
single connected network, or is it fragmented into two or more components? We also calculated 
                                                 
13 We report and interpret this indicator for specific types of nodes and networks where it makes conceptual sense: 
for suppliers in the concrete technological networks, supportive technological networks and for all participants in the 
entire network. We do not report it for clients in concrete technologicalor concrete partnerships as in these cases this 
indicator is not meaningful because closeness to other nodes in the network does not necessarily mean access to 
different suppliers or partners. 
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network level degree centralization of each network, which captures to what extent existing 
connections between countries are concentrated to one or more actor, or to say it in simple words, 
how big are the biggest actors – this metric approaches one in a star network with a single central 
actor and zero in a fully connected network where all nodes are interconnected (Freeman, 1978; 
Wasserman and Faust, 1994). The final measure used to evaluate the structure of a network is its 
average clustering coefficient. The clustering coefficient of individual nodes captures what share 
of their partners are also connected to each other forming triangles (triads). Averaging node level 
clustering for the whole network gives the average clustering coefficient of the whole network, 
thus giving an indication of the structure of the network (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). Before 
calculating density, closeness centrality and average clustering coefficient, we first converted each 
network into a symmetrical and binary network by removing link weights and link directions.14 
Furthermore, isolated dyads (if they existed) were removed from the transformed (binary, 
undirected) networks to calculate closeness centrality. 
                                                 
14 These undirected, binary networks only consider how many and which partners each country has. They do not take 
into consideration if the country is supplier or client, nor the number of agreements signed between two countries. 
Conceptually the existence of a single cooperation unit between two countries should suffice as a basis for future 
agreements, independent of the role that the countries play. This transformation also allowed us to investigate the 
question of centralization without the influence of the level of activity of individual actors. To calculate closeness 
centrality, isolates were removed. 
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Table 2. Data and network metrics used to answer each research question. 
Research question Data and Network metrics 
RQ1. What are the main types of 
international nuclear energy 
cooperation and how widespread is 
each type of cooperation?  
Number of cooperation units within different categories and 
sub-categories 
RQ2. Which countries are the main 
actors in each type of international 
nuclear energy cooperation? 
 
Degree metrics:  
- degree = number of partners 
- in-degree = number of suppliers 
- out-degree = number of clients 
- net degree = out-degree minus in-degree 
Weighted degree metrics:  
- weighted degree = number of cooperation links 
- weighted in-degree = number cooperation links in 
which the node is a client 
- weighted out-degree = number cooperation links in 
which the node is a supplier 
- net weighted degree = weighted out-degree minus 
weighted in-degree 
Closeness centrality = position within the network, how close 
they are to all other countries (scale: 0-1)* 
Percentage of cooperation units of various categories where 
the country acts as a supplier, client or partner 
RQ3. What are the characteristics 
of the international nuclear energy 
cooperation network? 
 
Node count = number of participating countries 
Link count = number of cooperation links in the network 
Density = how many links exist compared to the maximum 
possible number (scale: 0-1) 
Connectedness = number of connected components, one or 
more networks 
Network-level degree centralization = to what extent are the 
existing connections concentrated to a few countries** 
Average clustering coefficient = to what extent do countries 
form triads*** 
Note: *Closeness centrality of the binary and undirected networks, after removing isolated dyads has been 
calculated with ORA-LITE (2018), based on Freeman (1978) as: let D be the distance network defined as: D(i,j) = 
shortest path length from i to j, and D(i,i) = 0. The sum of shortest path lengths from node i to all other nodes is d 
= ∑Di,j : for all nodes j. And closeness centrality value for node i = (N-1) / d. 
** Degree centralization has been calculated with ORA-LITE (2018). Total degree centralization: let A be the input 
network with N nodes. Let v = vector of Total-Degree Centrality values for network A. Let c be the Centralization 
value for vector v, which is a measure of the vector's spread or variability that is defined as the normalized sum of 
distances from the maximum value. Then Total-Degree Centralization = c / (N – 2). In- and out-degree 
centralization: let A be the input network with N rows. Let v = vector of In/Out-Degree Centrality values for network 
A. Let c be the centralization value for vector v, which is a measure of the vector's spread or variability that is 
defined as the normalized sum of distances from the maximum value. In/Out-Degree Centralization = c / (N - 1). 
***Average clustering coefficient of the binary and undirected networks has been calculated ORA-LITE (ORA-LITE, 
2018), based on Watts and Stogatz (1998): “averaging the clustering coefficient of each node, which is defined as 
the density of the node's ego network. […] The ego network for node i consists of node i itself, all nodes directly 
connected to it, and the links between these nodes.” (ORA-LITE, 2018) 
Excel was used to generate link lists (of node to node relationships) which were then imported to 
UCINET (Borgatti et al., 2002), ORA-LITE (ORA-LITE, 2018) and Gephi (Bastian et al., 2009) 
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for analysis and visualization. Additional statistical calculations were carried out in Excel. The 
networks were visualized using the Force Atlas 2 layout algorithm of Gephi, which is an algorithm 
designed for networks characterized by a few highly connected nodes (Jacomy et al., 2014).  
3. Results 
3.1. Types of international nuclear cooperation 
We identified 738 cooperation units related to international cooperation in the field of civilian 
nuclear power. A little less than half of these (325) were from Keeley’s (Keeley, 2009a) list and the 
other half were from our own data collection.  
We found evidence of an actually signed agreement in about 70% (509) of the cooperation units; 
the remaining 30% were either memoranda of understanding or joint statements. Most 
cooperation units involved two countries; 14 agreements involved three countries. Approximately 
half of all cooperation units (360) contained directional elements and half (378) did not15, with 
almost all of the tripartite cooperation units having both a directional and a partnership 
component. These proportions were about the same with or without informal statements. 
Directional cooperation can be both concrete and supportive: for example, a supplier country 
assisting in building a nuclear power plant (concrete) or enhancing safety and security measures 
(supportive). Non-directional cooperation comes in many different forms: for example, between 
two established nuclear powers in setting up a national nuclear power program in a third country 
or between neighbors in building a joint nuclear infrastructure such as a nuclear power plant or 
                                                 
15 The sum of these two is greater than the total number of cooperation units because tripartite agreements often 
contain a partnership between two supplier countries and one client country (See Methods). 
16 
waste management facility. Partnerships are usually supportive and only about 20% of partnerships 
involve concrete cooperation. 
All in all, 252 (34%) of cooperation units include concrete technological material aspects16; the 
other technological cooperation units only contain supportive elements. Nuclear power plant 
construction and operation and reactor supply are included in 15% and 10% of cooperation units 
respectively. Approximately 13% of cooperation units have provisions related to the nuclear fuel 
cycle (supply of nuclear fuel or related materials, fuel reprocessing or construction of reprocessing 
facilities). Another 9% of cooperation units include decommissioning and waste management. 
Only 67 (9%) include cooperation in uranium exploration, mining or trade. Excluding non-binding 
changes each of these proportions by less than 3%. 
Many cooperation units with concrete elements also include provisions for supportive 
cooperation for knowledge exchange and capacity building. Such supportive elements are 
mentioned in 558 (about 76%) cooperation units and range from research and training (included 
in 52% of all units) to nuclear safety and security (29%) to planning, regulation and supportive 
infrastructure (14%) (Table 3). Supportive cooperation is essential for nuclear newcomers who 
normally need transfer of technological and regulatory knowledge from countries with existing 
nuclear programs. Even countries without commercial nuclear power are involved in supportive 
cooperation related to research and nuclear safety. 
  
                                                 
16 This does not include uranium-related cooperation (see Methods and Table 3). 
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Table 3 The extent of different types of international nuclear cooperation 
Type of cooperation Number of cooperation of each type 
 All Directional Partnerships Tri-partite 
All agreements 100% (737) 346 377 14 
Technological concrete  34% (252) 170 71 11 
Nuclear power plant Construction and 
operation 
15% (111) 86 18 7 
Reactor supply 10% (71) 61 8 2 
Nuclear fuel cycle 13% (98) 63 32 3 
Decommissioning and waste management 9% (64) 35 28 1 
Technological supportive 75% (558) 209 344 5 
Knowledge exchange and training 52% (384) 142 240 2 
Nuclear Safety and security 29% (213) 37 174 2 
Planning, regulation & supportive infrastructure 14% (102) 61 39 2 
No information 9% (63) 39 24 - 
Uranium 9% (67) 62 3 1 
Notes: The counts and percentages sum to more than 100% because the categories were coded in a non-exclusive 
manner. 
3.2. Main actors in international technological nuclear cooperation 
The full international technological nuclear cooperation network involves 83 countries and the 
European Union (EU) forming 355 country pairs. A total of 43 countries are suppliers in at least 
one cooperation unit, 65 countries are clients in at least one cooperation unit, and 69 countries are 
partners in at least one cooperation unit.17 The US and Russia dominate all types of cooperation: 
they have cooperation with the highest number of countries (degrees) and participate in the largest 
number of cooperation units (weighted degree). They are followed by France, China, Japan, Korea, 
India, Canada, Argentina and Ukraine. The US is best positioned to reach all other countries (it 
has the highest closeness centrality) closely followed by Russia, and less closely by France and 
                                                 
17 The EU is a supplier in one agreement, a client in another and a partner in 18 agreements. 
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Korea (Table 4). Virtually all countries with the exception of Niger and Venezuela participate in 
at least one non-uranium agreement.  
Table 4. Numbers of cooperation partners and cooperation units and network position 
for the ten most active countries in international technological nuclear cooperation  
Country Number of partner 
countries (degree) 
Number of cooperation 
units (weighted 
degree) 
Network position 
(closeness centrality) 
US 55 178 0.76 
Russia 51 155 0.71 
France 39 107 0.65 
China 27 76 0.57 
Japan 24 76 0.55 
Korea 31 70 0.61 
India 16 51 0.53 
Canada 26 49 0.57 
Argentina 19 37 0.54 
Ukraine 17 34 0.52 
3.2.1. Nuclear technology suppliers 
Only 17 countries and the EU are suppliers in at least one concrete technological agreement, and 
only six countries (Russia, US, France, China, Korea and Japan) account for 94% of suppliers in 
such agreements (Figure 2, Table 5). Russia is by far the largest technological supplier: in 81 (46%) 
of all concrete technological agreements (Table 5), which is more than three times France and the 
US, the two next most active concrete technological suppliers. Russia supplies technology to 35 
countries, which is more than twice as high as the country with the next highest number of national 
connections, France (16). Russia also dominates all sub-categories of concrete cooperation. These 
findings are robust to the inclusion or exclusion of non-binding cooperation statements.18 The 
only concrete form of cooperation where these six countries account for less than 80% of suppliers 
is decommissioning and waste, a less common type of cooperation mentioned only in 36 
                                                 
18 Excluding these non-binding cooperation statements changes the percentages in the table by 3% or less. 
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directional agreements. Argentina is a supplier in four agreements (11%): for three newcomers 
(UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Bolivia) and Australia in exchange for uranium supply. 
Table 5 Main suppliers in concrete technological cooperation 
Country 
Number of 
Participation in 
cooperating links 
% of cooperation units where country 
acts as supplier 
Network 
position 
(closeness 
centrality) 
Clients 
(out-
degree) 
Suppliers 
(in-
degree) 
As supplier 
(weighted 
out-degree) 
As client 
(weighted 
in-degree) 
All 
concrete 
technol. 
Construct. 
& operation 
Reactor 
supply 
Fuel 
cycle 
Decomiss. 
& waste 
Russia 35 1 81 1 46% 53% 51% 48% 53% 0.72 
France 16 1 23 1 13% 11% 6% 14% 11% 0.55 
US 11 0 18 0 10% 6% 6% 11% 8% 0.44 
China 10 5 17 14 10% 9% 13% 11% 3% 0.56 
Korea 13 0 15 0 8% 10% 11% 3% 3% 0.43 
Japan 9 3 14 3 8% 10% 2% 6% 0% 0.49 
All 
others 
-  -  12% 9% 11% 8% 25% - 
Note: The table includes the six most active supplier countries accounting suppliers in over 90% of cooperation 
units containing a concrete technological supply element. 
The largest supplier, Russia also has the highest closeness centrality, meaning that it is ‘closer’ in 
network terms to the other countries which may mean more countries readily have access to 
Russian technology. It is followed by China, France and the UK Interestingly, two of the largest 
suppliers (Korea and the US) have fairly low closeness centrality (29th and 22nd  respectively); this 
is because they are not connected to Russia which are central in the concrete technological network 
and connected to most other nodes. 
3.2.2. Nuclear technology clients 
India, China, Bulgaria and Ukraine are the most active clients in concrete technological 
cooperation (Table 6). The most active client countries except for Pakistan have several suppliers 
(in-degree). For example: Jordan, Turkey, the UAE and Saudi Arabia all have 8-9 cooperation links 
with 6 suppliers. Our analysis also shows that most countries serve primarily as either a supplier 
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or a client. This can be seen by comparing Table 5 and Table 6. The countries where this is not 
the case are China (supplier in 17 and client in 14 agreements), Argentina (supplier in 5 and client 
in 5) and the UK (supplier in 3 and client in 5).  
Table 6. Main clients in concrete technological cooperation 
Country Number of suppliers 
(in-degree) 
Number of cooperation 
links (weighted in-degree) 
% of units where the country is a 
client (directional concrete) 
India 3 16 9% 
China 5 14 8% 
Bulgaria 4 10 6% 
Ukraine 3 10 6% 
Jordan 6 9 5% 
Kazakhstan 3 8 4% 
Turkey 6 8 4% 
UAE 6 8 4% 
Vietnam 4 7 4% 
Armenia 3 6 3% 
Pakistan 1 6 3% 
Saudi Arabia 6 6 3% 
South Africa 3 6 3% 
All others - ≤5 ≤3% (total 42%) 
Note: The table excludes countries which are a client in five or less concrete technological cooperation links. It thus 
shows the 13 most active clients which account for over half of clients in concrete directional cooperation. 
3.2.3. Partners in concrete technological cooperation 
The five countries with the most concrete partnerships (highest weighted degree), Russia, France, 
Japan, the US and Korea (Table 5), are also among the top 6 suppliers in concrete technological 
cooperation (Table 7). Additionally, 8 countries and the EU participate in at least 5 concrete 
partnerships.  
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Table 7 Main participants in concrete technological partnerships 
Country 
Number of 
national 
partners 
(degree) 
Number of 
concrete 
partnerships 
(weighted 
degree) 
% of cooperation units where acts as a partner 
All 
concrete 
Construction & 
operation 
Reactor 
supply 
Fuel 
cycle 
Decomiss. & 
waste 
Russia 15 24 30% 36% 13% 29% 24% 
France 8 19 23% 32% 38% 9% 28% 
Japan 7 16 20% 16% 0% 18% 28% 
US 6 14 17% 16% 0% 12% 28% 
Korea 5 8 10% 16% 13% 15% 7% 
EU 7 7 9% 0% 0% 12% 14% 
Ukraine 5 7 9% 0% 0% 18% 3% 
Canada 6 6 7% 0% 0% 18% 0% 
UK 4 6 7% 8% 13% 0% 10% 
Argentina 3 5 6% 4% 13% 12% 3% 
Brazil 3 5 6% 4% 25% 9% 3% 
China 3 5 6% 16% 38% 3% 0% 
Finland 4 5 6% 12% 0% 0% 7% 
India 4 5 6% 0% 0% 9% 7% 
Note: Excludes countries with less than 5 concrete technological partnerships. 
This group includes the other one of the biggest suppliers (China), three countries operating 
nuclear fleets for over two decades (Canada, the UK, and Finland), two of the main client countries 
(India and Ukraine) and Brazil and Argentina which have three agreements between each other 
related to the construction of a joint nuclear power plant. The EU is another major player in the 
concrete technological partnerships providing financing and support for decommissioning as well 
as fuel cycle and nuclear waste services, particularly in Eastern Europe. 
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3.2.4. Participants in supportive technological cooperation 
Within purely supportive cooperation, countries involved in most cooperation units (highest 
weighted degree) are the same as the top six suppliers in concrete technological cooperation plus 
Canada. The US is the most active in supportive cooperation (weighted degree: 146), participating 
in 39% of non-concrete cooperation units with a Knowledge and training component and 52% of 
cooperation units with a Safety and security component. The US’ leadership in supportive 
cooperation may be linked to its historical dominance as a technology supplier and could in the 
future be eroded as Russia and other technology suppliers become more dominant.19 In contrast, 
Russia participates in only 11% of purely supportive cooperation units (weighted degree: 49). In 
addition to the top six suppliers of concrete technological cooperation are three nuclear veterans 
(Argentina, Canada, and the Czech Republic) and one of the most active clients (India). There are 
only five countries in our dataset that do not participate in supportive technological cooperation: 
Bolivia, Myanmar, Niger, Senegal and Venezuela. This could signal either very early stages of or a 
lack of seriousness about pursuing nuclear power. Senegal and Venezuela canceled their nuclear 
power programs after the Fukushima accident (Rogner, 2013). 
  
                                                 
19 For a discussion of the US’ historic leadership in setting nuclear safety and security standards and its link to its role 
as technology supplier see Saha (2017). 
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Table 8 Main participants in purely supportive technological cooperation 
Country 
Number 
of 
partners 
(degree) 
Number of 
supportive 
cooperation 
links 
(weighted 
degree) 
% of cooperation units where acts as a participant 
Network 
position 
(closeness 
centrality) 
Only 
supportive 
cooperation 
Knowledge 
exchange 
& training 
Nuclear 
safety & 
security 
Planning 
& 
regulation 
No 
information 
US 52 146 33% 39% 53% 27% 10% 0.75 
France 30 64 14% 18% 11% 10% 18% 0.61 
Russia 37 49 11% 8% 7% 14% 19% 0.63 
Korea 21 47 11% 10% 6% 6% 16% 0.56 
Japan 17 44 10% 11% 10% 8% 0% 0.53 
Canada 25 42 9% 10% 4% 24% 0% 0.56 
China 20 41 9% 8% 5% 3% 21% 0.53 
India 14 29 7% 5% 3% 7% 11% 0.52 
Argentina 13 22 5% 6% 6% 4% 2% 0.51 
Czech Rep. 11 21 5% 6% 9% 4% 2% 0.51 
Note: Includes countries which participate in at least 20 supportive cooperation links or 5% of all supportive units. 
The countries with the most connections (highest weighted degree) are the same as those with the 
highest closeness centrality scores. The US is closest to all other countries in the network, followed 
by Russia and France. 
3.3. Characteristics of the international technological nuclear 
cooperation network 
The network of all cooperation units (Figure 1, Table 9) forms a single connected component that 
involves 84 jurisdictions20 (nodes) and 342 unique country pairs (links). Japan and the US have the 
most agreements together (highest link weight of 20). The network has a density of 0.103 meaning 
                                                 
20 Eighty-three countries and the European Union (EU). 
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that around 10% of all possible connections are present, however these connections are 
concentrated around a few actors (degree centralization is 0.59).  
Figure 1 Aggregate network of all international technological nuclear cooperation units 
 
Note: Layout by Gephi Force Atlas 2 algorithm (see Methods). The size of each node is determined by the number 
of cooperation units the country has signed (weighted degree). All connections are mapped as undirected. Links 
are scaled according to the number of cooperation units between the countries (link weight). 
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The network of all nuclear cooperation shown in Figure 1 can be disaggregated into four networks 
by type of cooperation. The characteristics of these networks are listed in Table 9 and discussed 
in the next four subsections. 
Table 9. Characteristics of the aggregate and individual technological nuclear 
cooperation networks 
 Full 
Network 
Concrete Supportive  
Directional Partnerships 
Directional No Yes No No* 
Participating countries (Number of nodes) 84 55 36 79 
Number of cooperation pairs (links) 342 115 57 266 
Number of cooperation links (Total sum of 
weighted links) 719 189 83 450 
Highest number of links between two 
countries (Highest link weight) 20 10 6 13 
Countries with highest link weight Japan-US Russia-India Japan-US Japan-US 
Number of components 1 1 2 1 
Isolates na na 
Croatia-
Slovenia na 
Density (unweighted, directed) na 0.039 na na 
Density (unweighted, undirected) 0.103 0.076 0.09 0.086 
Out-degree centralization (unweighted, 
directed) na 0.621 na na 
In-degree centralization (unweighted, 
directed) na 0.074 na na 
Degree centralization (unweighted, 
directed) na 0.306 na na 
Undirected degree centralization 
(unweighted, undirected) 0.590 0.613 0.358 0.595 
Average clustering coefficient 
(unweighted, undirected) 0.574 0.251 0.171 0.503 
Notes: *Directional cooperation links in this network were converted to un-directional for the network analysis, see 
section 2.4. 
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3.3.1. Concrete directional technological cooperation  
Fifty-five countries involved in concrete directional technological cooperation form a single 
network with 113 unique country pairs and 189 cooperation links21 (sum of weighted links). The 
most cooperation links are between Russia and India (10). There are two bi-directional links: 
between Kazakhstan and Japan, and France and India.22 
The density of the network is 0.076 (unweighted, undirected), which is the lowest among the 
examined networks (Figure 2, Table 9). The suppliers of concrete technological cooperation are 
highly centralized: out-degree centralization is 0.621 as compared to in-degree centralization of 
clients which is merely 0.074. The average clustering coefficient of the network is merely 0.251, 
meaning that its local structure is more like a star-like network, with only 20% of a country’s 
partners being connected also to each other.  
                                                 
21 We use the term cooperation link to distinguish between cooperation unit because a cooperation unit can involve 
three parties whereas a cooperation link can only involve two. 
22 In the agreement where Kazakhstan is a supplier to Japan, Kazakhstan agrees to supply part of the nuclear fuel for 
one of Japan’s nuclear reactors. In the agreement where India is a supplier to France, India agrees to partially finance 
a French nuclear power plant. 
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Figure 2 Network of supplier and client countries formed by directional concrete 
technological cooperation units 
 
Notes: Layout by Gephi Force Atlas 2 algorithm (see Methods). In panel (a), each node is scaled by its activity as 
a supplier in directed concrete technological cooperation units (weighted out-degree); in panel (b), each node is 
scaled by its activity as a client in directed concrete technological cooperation units (weighted in-degree). Links are 
scaled according to the number of directed concrete technological cooperation links between the countries (link 
weight). 
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3.3.2. Concrete technological partnerships 
Thirty-six countries (nodes) form this network consisting of 57 country pairs (links) connected 
through 83 cooperation links. The network has a large component (34 nodes) and an isolated dyad 
of Croatia and Slovenia (which jointly operate a nuclear power plant located in Slovenia and which 
supplies a large share of Croatia’s electricity). The largest number of partnerships (6) is between 
Japan and the US (Figure 3, Table 9). The overall distribution of concrete partnerships is robust 
against including or excluding non-binding types of cooperation and changes the distribution by 
less than two percentage points.23  
Figure 3. Network of countries formed by concrete technological partnerships 
 
Note: Layout by Gephi Force Atlas 2 algorithm (see Methodology). The size of each node is scaled by the number 
of concrete technological partnerships the country has signed (weighted degree). Links are scaled according to 
the number of concrete technological partnerships between the countries (link weight).  
Centralization of the concrete technological partnerships is lower than the directional 
relationships: degree centralization is 0.358, meaning that the cooperation links are less 
                                                 
23 However, the distribution between countries within each subcategory is sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of 
non-binding statements. This is mostly due to the fact that there are relatively fewer concrete partnerships than other 
types of cooperation thus a few cooperation units can affect the distribution by up to 15 percentage points. Most 
notably, removing non-binding statements increases Russia’s dominance in Construction and operation by 10 
percentage points and decreases Korea’s proportion by 13 percentage points. 
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concentrated around a few actors. Its clustering coefficient, on the other hand, is low averaging at 
0.171, indicating a local structure around nodes that are star-like. 
3.3.3. Supportive cooperation 
The 450 cooperation links of purely supportive cooperation form a network that involve 79 
countries (nodes), that form 266 unique country pairs (links) in a single connected network. The 
highest number of agreements (link weight) is 13 between Japan and the US The density of the 
network is 0.086 (Table 9, Figure 4). The distribution of main actors in all supportive cooperation 
is robust to the exclusion of non-binding cooperation and changes the distribution between the 
top participants by less than 5%. However, for the sub-categories, excluding non-binding 
statements increases the US’ dominance in safety and security, knowledge and training and 
planning and regulation by about 20 percentage points which reflects the country’s seriousness 
about in engaging in cooperation related to safety and security. It also increases Russia and 
Canada’s dominance in planning and regulation by 11 and 18 percentage points respectively. 
This network is highly centralized: its degree centralization is 0.595, indicating that most 
cooperation units are concentrated around a few major actors, see also Table 8. The average 
clustering coefficient of countries in supportive technological cooperation (0.503), is much higher 
than for other types of cooperation. This means that, on average, more than half of each countries’ 
partners are also connected to each other. Intuitively, it makes sense: countries more easily form 
supportive cooperation links which are not constrained by their ‘hard’ technological capabilities. 
The flow of knowledge is easier than the flow of equipment, infrastructure and finance.  
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Figure 4 Network of countries formed by purely supportive technological cooperation 
units 
 
Note: Layout by Gephi Force Atlas 2 algorithm (see Methods). The size of each node is determined by the number 
of supportive technological partnerships the country has signed (weighted degree). Links are scaled according to 
the number of supportive technological partnerships between the countries (link weight). 
4. Limitations and avenues for further research 
There are a number of limitations to our approach which should be addressed with further 
research. Using reports of cooperation agreements as a proxy for international activity has the 
potential to under-sample cooperation between private companies and cooperation which is less 
publicized. This approach is also unable to distinguish between agreements which are likely to go 
ahead and those which may be simply signed for prestige or strategic reasons. To understand the 
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extent of these limitations, this database could be supplemented with a detailed case study of a 
handful of country-pairs to see how frequently nuclear cooperation agreements are signed by 
private companies without government-to-government activity and to quantify the relationship 
between supportive and concrete cooperation as well as to estimate the percentage of agreements 
which are signed for purely symbolic reasons. Those clients in advanced stages of planning new 
nuclear power programs, such as Turkey, UAE, and Vietnam would be prime candidates for this 
analysis. 
Another promising direction of future research is to explore the time dynamics of nuclear 
cooperation. Our sampling approach focuses on the period 2000-2015 from a number of 
established databases and targeted online searches (see section 2.1). While this sampling approach 
is appropriate for our research question which focuses on which actors and arrangements will 
shape the future of nuclear energy, it probably under-samples routine on-going cooperation, 
particularly between established partners who do not have nuclear power expansion plans. This 
approach also does not account for the expiration of agreements nor how agreements may change 
over time. Expanding the sample period would open the door for a wider range of research 
questions. For example, how has international nuclear cooperation changed over time and how 
has it been affected by the privatization of the nuclear industry in some countries?  
Using time series analysis, would also make it possible to explore at questions such as how many 
years after importing nuclear technologies it takes a country able to become a supplier.24 This 
would give more insight into when China and India may be able to export nuclear technologies. 
Combining time series analysis with more granular analysis of cooperation with private firms (if 
such data could be obtained from the historical record), it would be possible to explore when US 
                                                 
24 This would expand earlier work from Choi et al. (2009) about the length of time it takes to ‘localize’ a nuclear 
industry to how long it takes to export that industry. 
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firms lost their dominance as nuclear exporters. It would also make it possible to explore whether 
nuclear suppliers played a role in the different cost trajectories observed in countries with nuclear 
power (Loevering et al. 2016; Koomey et al. 2016; Grubler 2010) Finally, it would be good to 
compare the top suppliers in our dataset to see whether their nuclear export strategy changed after 
Fukushima. 
It would also be possible to expand the network analysis. Using network analysis to understand 
international networks has a long tradition with three main types of analysis: to identify clusters or 
neighborhoods of countries using data such as on trade or membership in international 
organizations; to test world-systems theory or the theory that many factors which influence a 
nation state’s development are exogenous to that state (and belong to the “world system”); and 
more recently to explore key questions in international relations and political science (Nordlund, 
2011). Our use of network analysis is closest to the first tradition to gain insights into the nature 
and geography of an international network. We do not position our research to either extend or 
test world-systems theory or key IR theories though the dataset we present could potentially also 
be used to test hypotheses in those literatures. There are two particularly promising avenues in this 
regard. On the one hand, using a longer time series analysis, would make it possible to see how 
the network has evolved overtime and how different technologies move through the network. 
Another promising area is to expand the analysis as to why supplier states cooperate in the first 
place which could build on work by both Fuhrmann (2009) and Lantis (2014) who explore this 
question. 
5. Conclusion and policy implications 
While nuclear energy plays an important role in energy, its international political economy remains 
much less researched and understood than international political economy of other energy sources, 
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particularly oil and gas. Our study addresses this gap by building and systematically analyzing a 
comprehensive dataset of 738 recent international civil nuclear agreements and non-binding 
statements of cooperation between 84 jurisdictions. In addition to descriptive statistics, we use 
network science methods, a tool for studying international cooperation. 
5.1. Summary of findings 
We find evidence of significant international cooperation in all types of international technological 
nuclear cooperation, including construction and operation of nuclear power plants, manufacturing 
of nuclear reactors, production of nuclear fuel, decommissioning and waste management, and 
supply of uranium (Table 3). Such tangible material elements feature in over 40%. A related 
observation is that about 60% cooperation does not include any material aspects, but instead 
covers regulatory and knowledge-exchange provisions, especially in the field of nuclear safety and 
security. Since such provisions also feature in many agreements with concrete material elements, 
this type of ‘supportive’ cooperation is clearly the most widespread form of international 
technological nuclear cooperation. 
Our analysis confirms earlier findings (Brutschin and Jewell, 2018; Cherp et al., 2012) that despite 
the large number of countries involved in international technological nuclear cooperation it is 
dominated by only a handful of countries, most notably Russia and the US. However, the main 
nuclear suppliers and clients somewhat differ across different types of cooperation. To begin with, 
only six countries (Russia, France, the US, China, Korea and Japan) are suppliers in over 90% of 
all agreements with concrete technological elements, with Russia being a supplier in 46% of all 
such agreements and in over 50% of agreements concerning nuclear power plant construction and 
nuclear reactors. The same six countries are also involved in the largest number of concrete 
technological partnerships and supportive cooperation (e.g. knowledge and regulations). However, 
the US, rather than Russia is the most active participant in supportive cooperation: it is involved 
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in one-third of all supportive agreements and more than one-half of cooperation concerned with 
safety and security. 
The dominance of Russia in international technological nuclear cooperation has been observed by 
other authors. A recent article in Foreign Affairs calls attention to the fact that Russia has 34 reactor-
supply deals worth about $300 billion, making up about 60% of the global reactor market (Galluci 
and Schellenberger, 2017). This figure is remarkably close to our finding that Russia is a supplier 
in over 50% of reactor agreements. What we also find is that in addition to reactor supply, Russia 
dominates agreements related to construction and operation of nuclear power plants, the fuel cycle 
and waste management. Lantis (2014) argued that both strategic and economic considerations 
(especially diversifying hard currency earnings from gas and oil revenues) may be behind Russia’s 
interest in exporting nuclear technology and that it is difficult for other countries to compete with 
state-owned Russian companies for international markets. It is not uncommon for Russia to offer 
comprehensive deals including financing and training as part of its reactor supply and nuclear 
power plant construction. Such deals are made possible by a well-coordinated network of state-
owned subsidiaries of Atomenergoprom (led by Rosatom), which has offices in over 60 countries 
(ROSATOM, 2016). This may be especially attractive for newcomers such as Turkey (Jewell and 
Ates, 2015) and Belarus which have signed intergovernmental agreements with Russia under which 
Russia will pay for, build and operate the nuclear power plants in exchange for a guaranteed 
electricity price for a fixed number of years. 
Russia is a supplier in more nuclear technology agreements than the four next largest suppliers 
(France, US, China and Korea) combined. American companies have comparable technological 
capabilities to Russia, but as Lantis (2014) points out, American companies not only lack 
comparable state-backing but also can only cooperate with countries which have signed the 123 
agreement. This restriction requires client countries to limit nuclear activities in exchange for the 
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right to purchase equipment from American firms. The recent bankruptcy of Westinghouse may 
signal further weakening the US position on the global nuclear market (Galluci and Schellenberger, 
2017). The question is whether the decline of the US’ technological dominance will also lead to an 
erosion of its role in supportive and capacity building cooperation.25 Although Lantis (2014) found 
evidence of a ‘race’ for clients between Russia and Japan and Cherp et al. (2017) point to Japanese 
corporations actively acquiring overseas nuclear technology assets in the 2000s, our analysis does 
not identify Japan as a particularly active supplier. 
China is a supplier in only 11% of concrete technological agreements, though it is pursuing a 
strategy to export nuclear technology (WNA, 2016b; Wübbeke and Ting, 2016). With its state-
owned centralized nuclear power industry and deep pockets, China could potentially compete with 
Russia as a supplier. Even though most of their fleet has been built with imported technologies, 
Chinese firms are now working on advanced reactor designs which they hope to export. India also 
emerges as an interesting case as the largest client in both concrete and supportive cooperation. 
This is probably due to two reasons: plans for expanding its own nuclear power to and a strategy 
of strengthening its domestic industry to eventually become an exporter. India has a handful of 
domestically produced nuclear power plants and is actively pursuing both technological and 
political developments which would enable it to become a major exporter (WNA, 2016c). 
The clients of nuclear technology are less concentrated than suppliers (the six largest clients 
account for only 32% of the agreements), a fact that further solidifies the power of major suppliers. 
While suppliers are mostly industrialized countries with large and older domestic nuclear power 
fleets, the main nuclear technology clients are dominated by nuclear newcomers, i.e. countries 
interested in launching national nuclear programs (Vietnam, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, UAE, 
                                                 
25 For a discussion of the US’ historical leadership in defining and global nuclear safety and security standards see Saha 
(2017). 
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Algeria, Turkey and Kazakhstan). The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) assumes that 
all nuclear newcomers will initially import the technology and features the readiness to invite 
international bids as a milestone to introducing nuclear power (IAEA, 2015) which underlines the 
centrality of international technological cooperation in national plans to launch nuclear power 
programs. It’s possible that the level of client activity could be an indication of seriousness 
regarding the pursuit of nuclear energy. 
Our network analysis identifies a somewhat different structure of international technological 
nuclear cooperation networks depending on the type of cooperation. The concrete technological 
nuclear cooperation network is fairly centralized with few dominant actors and ‘star-like’ 
structures, whereas the network of supportive cooperation is less centralized and more ‘mesh-like’. 
This means that knowledge and regulatory procedures (which are obviously less constrained by 
‘hard’ financial and technological capabilities) can more freely flow between countries, not 
necessarily involving major hubs such as Russia. This, once again, emphasizes a distinct nature of 
supportive cooperation that should be subject to more detailed analysis in the future. 
5.2. Policy implications 
Our findings also can inform policies by highlighting risks and opportunities of future 
developments of nuclear energy. Our view of potential future expansion of nuclear power diverges 
from on the one hand ‘techno-nationalists’ who describe the development of nuclear power as 
primarily a national project (Hansen et al. 2015; Oreskes 2015) and on the other hand from energy 
modelers investigating whether nuclear power is needed to achieve climate targets (Clarke et al., 
2014; Kim et al., 2014; Lehtveer and Hedenus, 2015b; Riahi et al., 2012) on the global scale and in 
purely economic terms. In contrast, we believe that cooperation between individual nations 
motivated by both economic and political (first and foremost energy security) considerations will 
play a central role in future nuclear power scenarios. This article is the first systematic analysis of 
37 
the international technological nuclear landscape; this section reflects on the policy implications 
of this analysis. 
It is important to recognize that international nuclear technological cooperation is likely to be 
dominated by a few major suppliers, most notably by Russia. Effective and safe models of such 
cooperation need to be developed for any scenario of significant nuclear power expansion to 
succeed. Currently there are two main models of nuclear reactor supply. The UAE has contracted 
a South Korean firm to build the country’s first nuclear power plant and the Emiratis are paying 
for the plant. In contrast, Belarus and Turkey have signed build-own-operate contracts with Russia 
in which Russia pays, builds and owns the plants in exchange for a guaranteed electricity price for 
a certain number of years. If successful, it could help many newcomers to overcome the key 
challenge of achieving sufficient investment and domestic capacity to manage nuclear power. At 
the same time, there are still a number of uncertainties including how liability, investment recovery, 
and the risk of policy changes (IAEA, 2014b). Secondly, this may put client countries in uncertainty 
related to economic and financial stability of the supplier (such as the recent fluctuations of the 
Russian ruble). 
Whatever the chosen model, the concentration of potential nuclear suppliers may present energy 
security risks. This is especially important since a serious motivation for introducing nuclear power 
for many countries is precisely energy security (Fuhrmann, 2012; Gourley and Stulberg, 2013; 
Price, 1990; Sovacool and Valentine, 2012). Nuclear power expansion decreases energy security 
risks by reducing imported fossil fuels, increasing the diversity of electricity systems (NEA, 2010; 
Watson and Scott, 2009), shielding consumers from fluctuations in fossil fuel prices (IAEA, 2008) 
and alleviating scarcity concerns (Macfarlane and Miller, 2007; NEA, 2008). However, it has the 
potential to introduce new ones, most importantly technological dependence. The risk of Russia a 
sole supplier of nuclear fuel for certain nuclear plants in the EU has been flagged as a security risk 
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(European Commission, 2014). Hungary, Slovakia, Bulgaria and the Czech Republic, along with a 
third of Finland’s nuclear power fleet can only be fueled by a single Russian company which has 
led Westinghouse (a competing nuclear fuel supplier) to warn the EU of these plants’ energy 
insecurity (Oliver, 2014). This discussion highlights an important difference between dependence 
risks associated with nuclear power and those associated with oil and gas: while oil and gas risks 
are primarily short-term shocks which can be dealt with by strategies such as excess storage and 
diversity of suppliers, nuclear power risks entail long-term dependencies which cannot be 
addressed so simply as they lock client countries into particular dependencies that cannot be easily 
addressed.  
Our analysis shows that dependencies in case of nuclear power are not limited to nuclear fuel and 
not concentrated in Europe (as is the case with natural gas). We show that suppliers of nuclear 
technology, especially of reactors and nuclear power plants may be more concentrated than those 
of oil and gas. Russia is the supplier in 43% of nuclear technology agreements, whereas Saudi 
Arabia supplies only 19% of internationally traded crude oil and Russia 20% of natural gas. Six 
countries account for 90% of suppliers of nuclear technology, while about 18 countries supply 
about 90% of oil and gas.26 
While the international community has already recognized the importance of the international 
cooperation in the development of nuclear power, thus far, the focus has primarily been limited 
to fuel banks such as the IAEA-backed one initially proposed by Mohammed El-Baradei (IAEA, 
2006) and the US-backed Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) which was established in 
2006 by the second Bush administration to support the safe expansion of nuclear power around 
the world primarily through expanding fuel services in established nuclear countries (US 
                                                 
26 Calculated from IEA data (2016). 
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Department of Energy, 2006). Neither of these initiatives include infrastructural development 
services as a primary focus, though GNEP was transformed into the International Framework for 
Nuclear Energy Cooperation and its mission to include nuclear infrastructure development 
(IFNEC, 2016) and the IAEA also hosts Technical Meetings to support newcomer countries in 
developing their national positions on nuclear power. Our results highlight that any expansion of 
nuclear energy would go far beyond fuel dependencies. Furthermore, much of the literature on 
future energy security highlights how low-carbon policies decreases fossil energy imports (Cherp 
et al., 2016; Jewell et al., 2014; 2016; McCollum et al., 2014). However, insofar as they increase the 
use of nuclear power they may introduce new patterns of dependence.  
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